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We have attempted to detect seismic signals from small explosions in North Korea on
five specific days in 2010 that feature in scenarios proposed by De Geer. We searched
the seismic data recorded by station MDJ in northeastern China, applying three-
component cross-correlation methods using signals from known explosions as tem-
plates. We assess the capability of this method of detection, and of simpler methods,
all of which failed to find seismic signals that would be expected if De Geer’s scenarios
were valid. We conclude that no well-coupled underground explosion above about a ton
occurred near the North Korea test site on these five days and that any explosion would
have to be very small (local magnitude less than about 2) to escape detection.
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INTRODUCTION
De Geer1 has proposed that there is radionuclide evidence for two low-yield
nuclear explosions in North Korea in April and May, 2010. Because it is impor-
tant to find confirming evidence for such a serious claim and thus build support
for it, or to find objective and contrary evidence and thus help to make the case
that the claim is invalid, we have analyzed data from one of the openly avail-
able seismographic stations, MDJ, in northeastern China, that has recorded
high quality signals in the past from small explosions and earthquakes in or
near North Korea.2,3
De Geer noted that there was no seismological evidence for explosions in
North Korea on the dates he has proposed, and he interprets that conclusion
in the context of a summary statement on seismic monitoring capability as
follows: “The largest well-coupled explosion in North Korea that could go un-
detected by seismic sensors outside the country has been estimated at some 50
tons TNT-equivalent.” We take issue with this statement in two ways. First,
in the context of how it has been used by De Geer (to characterize the size of
hypothesized seismically undetected explosions at the North Korea test site on
specific days), we argue that the largest well-coupled undetectable explosion
on days he has identified, and near the North Korea test site, would have to
have been about a hundred times smaller than he has claimed. Second, we dis-
cuss in general the issue of setting post hoc limits on seismic detectability at
specific locations. We point out that such an exercise is very different, for sev-
eral reasons, from estimating the present or future detection capability, or the
threshold monitoring level, of an actual or a hypothesized network. In prac-
tice, when looking at a date in the past to see what limits can be placed on
what might have happened at a particular location, what matters most is an
assessment of the data that is actually available from the most sensitive sta-
tion or stations—which may not be a part of any declared monitoring network.
There can be an understandable reluctance to take data from such stations into
account when assessing detection capability in the future, absent any require-
ment to maintain stations that are not a part of any treaty-monitoring opera-
tion, and absent any obligation by a monitoring organization to incorporate a
continuous data stream from such stations (even when the data are available)
into the overall detection process for treaty-monitoring, every minute of every
day. But on the other hand it is not appropriate to ignore data from such sta-
tions if one or more of them can provide relevant data to assess an important
claim concerning something that might have happened in the past.
In the following section, we describe our analysis of MDJ data on specific
days proposed by De Geer as being candidates for nuclear explosions either at
the North Korean nuclear test site—or, more generally, on those same days,
as having perhaps been conducted elsewhere in North Korea. In a final sec-
tion, we discuss our results in light of his specific claims, and more generally
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the way in which an assessment of what might have happened in the past, in
a particular region and within a certain time interval, can be very different
from making an assessment of the capability of what a particular monitoring
network can achieve at present or in the future.
Our commentary does not include any analysis of the specific radionuclide
data reported by De Geer. In general, we note that capabilities to detect ra-
dioxenons have greatly increased in the last decade; and that analysts are still
building up the necessary body of experience to explain many different types
of interesting and to some extent poorly understood signals that such detec-
tors are now beginning to provide. Seismic data, too, can provide occasional
surprises; but several decades of experience, and a substantial infrastructure
of regional, national, and international agencies, have led to the practical ca-
pabilities needed in characterizing several hundred seismic events around the
world that are now documented to occur, down to very low magnitudes, on a
typical day.
In general, the results of our seismic analysis do not support De Geer’s
main claims, and indicate an absence of significant explosions at the North
Korea test site on days he has highlighted.
ANALYSIS
De Geer proposes that there is radionuclide evidence for two low-yield North
Korean nuclear explosions in April/May 2010. He acknowledges that there is
no seismological evidence for these events, but he does not indicate how much
effort has been made to search for relevant seismic detections. The importance
of his claim led us to carry out our own search for seismic evidence, using a
station that is particularly sensitive to seismic events in North Korea.
Several different procedures have been implemented for purposes of es-
timating the detection capability of a given seismographic network. Kværna
et al.4 point out the merits of using a time-dependent detection threshold that
takes account of interfering signals and the possibility of unusual background
noise conditions or outages of key stations, to the extent that either or both of
these features may be present. They describe two complementary approaches,
the first being a detection threshold which estimates the smallest hypotheti-
cal event in a given region that could possibly be detected according to spe-
cific criteria (for example, by three stations to enable making a useful location
estimate), and the second being a monitoring threshold that provides an es-
timate of the largest hypothetical seismic event in a given region that could
possibly have occurred without being detected. They go on to describe an eval-
uation of the threshold monitoring approach for the North Korean test site
using several seismographic stations, most of them being arrays in the Pri-
mary Network of the International Monitoring System (IMS). Figure 1 shows
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Figure 1: Locations of two nuclear tests in North Korea (9 October 2006 and 25 May 2009;
stars), seismographic station MDJ (hexagon), seismographic stations of the IMS (encircled
triangles), GSN stations (hexagons), and other stations of other networks in the North
Korea/China region (triangles). The small chemical explosions of August 1998 that were
easily detected at MDJ are shown with shaded triangles, whereas those that were not
detected by STA/LTA analysis (see text) are plotted with open triangles.
the location of seismographic stations and various seismic sources on and near
the Korean penisula. In particular it shows the location of the Mudanjiang sta-
tion (code MDJ) in northeastern China that has provided the data for our own
analysis.
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Using short-time averages of filtered beams to represent amplitude levels,
Kværna et al. find that IMS stations provided a monitoring threshold for the
North Korean nuclear test site that was slightly below magnitude 3 for most of
9 October 2006 (the day of the first DPRK nuclear test explosion—which was
well-detected by the IMS and by many other stations), decreasing, according
to their figures, to about magnitude 2.55 with the addition of the MDJ station.
Although this represents an excellent capability, in our opinion it can be sig-
nificantly improved in the present case of a search for small explosions at or
near a particular location, since we have two high-quality recordings of such
events in the MDJ archive and can use a cross-correlation detector, rather that
Kværna et al.’s reliance upon a short-time average to represent signals levels.
Thus, we have applied a three-component correlation detector to contin-
uous data from MDJ in order to provide an upper bound on the size of un-
detected explosions occurring at or near the North Korea test site. Later in
this section we discuss more generally the continuous recordings at MDJ for
specific days in April/May 2010, which contain numerous detections from local
events in Manchuria and several detections of teleseismic events.
For our master templates we use the two North Korean explosions that
were well detected in 2006 and 2009 (Figure 2), the first with IMS magnitude
mb 4.1 and the second event with IMS magnitude mb 4.5. MDJ recorded both
of these events with high signal-to-noise ratio.6 De Geer has proposed that a
small nuclear test explosion occurred on or about 11 May 2010, or possibly on
the previous day (all times in this paper taken as UTC unless noted as local
time). The radiochemical data are not diagnostic of a single explosion and De
Geer has further hypothesized that a previous small nuclear test also occurred,
around mid-April that same year. His analysis for the most part takes the
events as possibly occurring at the North Korea test site used for the nuclear
explosions of 2006 and 2009. We have therefore examined the continuous data
recorded at MDJ for three days starting on 14 April 2010 and for two days
starting on 10 May 2010, and our use at this point of a correlation detector
is by implication a search for a seismic event coming from the same general
location as the sources of the template signals.
The 2006 and 2009 North Korean explosions occurred about 2.6 km apart.7
Figure 2 shows that they have waveforms which are similar to the eye (e.g.,
similar time intervals between the regional phases Pn, Pg, and Lg). For our
first test we used the 2006 event as a master template and ran it through
the three-component correlation detector on the 2009 data. The window length
was taken as 200 s and the data (20 samples per second) were filtered to re-
move frequencies below 0.5 hz, so that effectively the frequency band covered
the range from 0.5 to 8 hz. We made these choices because in previous experi-
ence with this type of analysis they gave the best results for an appropriately
large time-bandwidth product. Figure 3a shows the cross correlation trace that
results. There is a maximum value of 0.2 and a strong detection spike that oc-
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Figure 2: Master templates from 2006 and 2009 North Korean nuclear explosions filtered from
0.5 to 8 hz and reduced to P-wave arrival time. Vertical, north, and east components are
shown for station MDJ. These are recordings of the ground velocity at MDJ. The largest signal
amplitude is noted for each trace. The first-arriving signal, Pn, has traveled via a fast path at
the top of the mantle. The second arrival, Pg, also quite impulsive, has traveled within the
crust. About a minute after Pn, the relatively weak Lg signals arrive, with slightly stronger
amplitudes on the horizontal components.
curs at the correct time for the 2009 event at 100 s or 0.027 hours from the
beginning of the data record.
To detect spikes above the background noise levels we also used a scaled
cross correlation coefficient (SCC) which quantifies the deviation of the cross
correlation coefficient from an empirical distribution of background values
based on a moving window throughout the correlation trace.8 Each point in
the cross correlation trace, CCi, is scaled by the mean absolute value of the
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Figure 3: (a) Average three-component CC trace using the 2006 explosion signal as a
master template and running over 2009 explosion data. Maximum value of the trace is 0.20
and is shown with horizontal dotted line. (b) SCC trace derived from CC trace in (a).
Maximum value of the trace is 9.76 and is shown with horizontal dotted line.











To avoid side-lobes of the cross correlation trace, the N and d values here
correspond to a moving window of length 20 s that is delayed (the d values)
by 0.2 s. Another advantage of using SCC is that it is less dependent on the
frequency band and window length than CC.9 Intuitively, it gives the statistical
significance of the cross correlation coefficient.
The scaled cross correlation trace (SCC) is shown in Figure 3b and sim-
ilarly shows a strong detection spike at the correct time with a high empir-
ical maximum value of 9.76. These tests confirm that a correlation detector
works for two single-fired explosions that occur near each other. Gibbons and
Ringdal10 showed for the same two North Korean nuclear explosions that a
multi-channel correlation detector using a 2006 template was able to detect
the 2009 event clearly on the MJAR array (Matsushiro, Japan) with no false
alarms in a three year period. This was a demonstration of the power of the
cross-correlation detection technique since MJAR is not in a quiet location
and standard detection (short-time average compared to long-time average)
failed at this array. Another example of automatic correlation detection of two
nuclear explosions has been demonstrated at the Lop Nor test site with two
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tunnel explosions about 100 m apart.11,12 Those events had a maximum CC >
0.8 which is remarkably high for a long window including the whole waveform.
Having established that a correlation detector works for different nuclear
explosions that are located close to each other, in a number of studies conducted
by independent researchers using different stations, we then searched for the
existence of new (i.e., previously undetected) explosions at the North Korean
test site, assuming that they did not occur far from the previous explosions.
We obtained CC and SCC traces for the three days of interest in April 2010,
and the two days in May, using first the 2006 template and then the 2009
template. Figure 4 shows the SCC trace using the 2009 template for 14–16
April (Figure 4a) and 10–11 May (Figure 4b). For these 72-hour and 48-hour
periods there are no obvious detection spikes of the type shown in Figure 3.
The maximum values of CC (0.07 and 0.06) and SCC (6.82 and 6.98) are much
less than those for Figure 3 with the known explosions. When we used the
template from 2006, our results were similar: there are no observed detection
spikes, and the maximum values of CC and SCC are low.
Table 1 summarizes the results of our search using MDJ data for North
Korean explosions on or close to the test site for the five days in question during
April/May 2010. Additional evidence against real detection spikes is that the
times for the maximum CC and SCC values for a particular master template
and data record are different by many hours. We can also examine the times
for the maximum values between the 2006 and 2009 master events. We would
expect that true detections would show up at approximately the same time for
the 2006 and 2009 masters since they are similar. But Table 1 shows that they
do not align for the two master events.13
The relative size of an event of interest compared to the master (template)
event can be determined from an amplitude scaling factor, α:
log α = x · y
x · x ,
where x and y are the vectors of data for the template and the event of inter-
est, respectively.14 This equation gives the least squares solution for a linearly
scaled signal, y = αx + n, where n is uncorrelated noise. This scaling factor is
identical to the unnormalized cross correlation coefficient divided by the inner
product of the template waveform. Since we are working with three-component
data we concatenate the vertical, north, and east vectors in the x and y vectors
to invert for a single amplitude scaling factor that best fits all three compo-
nents. A relative magnitude can then be defined by the logarithm of the ampli-
tude scaling factor,
δ mag = logα .
To compute the magnitude of a new event compared to the magnitude of
the template we add the relative magnitude to the magnitude of the template
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Figure 4: SCC trace using the 2009 explosion as a master template. (a) Shows 3 days of
continuous MDJ data (12 hours per line) beginning on 14 April 2010, filtered from 0.5 to 8 hz.
Dotted horizontal line shows maximum SCC value of 6.82 for reference. Maximum CC value
is 0.07. (b) Similar, but showing 2 days beginning on 10 May 2010; dotted horizontal line
shows maximum SCC value of 6.98, and maximum CC is 0.06.
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Table 1: Summary of CC and SCC search results for North Korean explosions on five
days in 2010. All searches were based on templates with 200 s window length and
frequencies passed in the band from 0.5 to about 8 hz.
Master Period Type Time Mag
2006 14–16 Apr CC 15 Apr
04:03:47.20
1.93
2006 14–16 Apr SCC 15 Apr
10:46:04.60
1.44
2006 10–11 May CC 11 May
07:08:53.10
1.68
2006 10–11 May SCC 10 May
08:10:31.35
1.49
2009 14–16 Apr CC 15 Apr
04:04:28.00
1.80
2009 14–16 Apr SCC 16 Apr
11:19:53.45
1.15
2009 10–11 May CC 10 May
01:53:45.40
1.51
2009 10–11 May SCC 11 May
03:52:59.00
1.39
event. An upper bound on the magnitude calculated in this way from unnor-
malized cross-correlation is shown in the last column of Table 1. The upper
bound for the magnitude derived from the time of the maximum SCC value is
always less than that derived from the maximum CC. The lowest upper bound
on magnitude for a possible nuclear test explosion for three days beginning
on 14 April 2010 is mb 1.15 as computed from the 2009 master template. The
lowest upper bound on magnitude for a possible test for the two days begin-
ning on 10 May 2010 is mb 1.39, also computed from the 2009 master template.
The 2006 master template determines upper bounds on magnitudes that range
from 0.1 to 0.29 magnitude units greater than the upper bounds on magnitude
determined by the 2009 master template. We presume that this is due at least
in part to the lower signal-to-noise ratio of the 2006 signals, which were for an
explosion about five times smaller than that of 2009.15
If the nuclear tests suspected by De Geer were conducted at locations other
than the known North Korean test site at Mount Mantap (Punggye-lee region),
the waveform correlation detector will not be effective unless we have suitable
templates derived from MDJ signals due to seismic events near the suspected
region.16 However, we can still place useful limits (though not so low), using
more conventional detectors and indeed just by classical seismogram inspec-
tion and interpretation of signals, as we discuss using Figure 5 and related
sources of information.
Thus, the U.S. Geological Survey’s National Earthquake Information Cen-
ter reports 175 seismic events in its Preliminary Determination of Epicenters
(PDE) occurring globally for the three days 14–16 April 2010. We see signals
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Figure 5: Twenty-four hours of MDJ data (showing the vertical component only, of ground
velocity) on 14–15 April 2010 in the frequency band from 1 to 16 hz. This is a compressed
display since each line represents sixty minutes of data sampled 40 times per second. Local
time is indicated at the beginning of each trace. Background noise levels are obviously
higher during working hours (from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m.), than during night hours (from 9 p.m. to 3
a.m.). During this 24-hour period there were 15 teleseismic events with mb greater than 4.5.
Expected P-wave arrival times from these teleseismic events are indicated by vertical bars,
and are identified by distance (given in degrees), magnitude, and event number (1 to 15).
Teleseismic signals that are discernable on the record are from several events that occurred
in Qinhai Province, western China (distance about 28◦) from 8 a.m. to 9 a.m. local time on
this day. There are several tens of impulsive signals during this 24-hour period. A conventional
signal detector based on comparison of the short-time average to the long-time average
detected most of these signals, and they are indicated by the symbol “d”. Among these
impulsive arrivals, six are identified as probably quarry blasts, here indicated by “Q”. From
measurement of the time between P- and S-wave arrivals, these signals are at distances in
the range from 40 to 220 km from MDJ and hence not in North Korea. Other impulsive signals
may be mostly due to local effects such as traffic, electric motors, and passing trains
(“cultural noise”). No signals have the characteristics of a source in North Korea. Amplitudes
of signals and noise are described in the text.
from some of them in Figure 5, which is for a 24-hour period, but they are
somewhat suppressed by our choice of the frequency band from 1 to 16 hz
which accentuates explosion signals. (Going down to 0.5 hz, would result in
much clearer detection of the teleseisms.)
Most of the detections, marked as “d” on this Figure (see caption), appear
as spiky features from local cultural sources occurring between 9 a.m. and
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6 p.m. local time (01 to 10h UTC). The instrument response is essentially flat
to ground velocity in the band we have used, and the amplitude of the back-
ground noise level ranges from about 0.15 µm/s (microns/second) during quiet
night hours and 0.25 to 0.35 µm/s during working hours (Figure 5). Somewhat
surprising, are signals from a night-time quarry blast at 04:04 local time on
April 15 (in most countries, blasting is usually confined to daylight hours). It
has a peak amplitude of 0.63 µm/s and there are short-period Rayleigh waves,
typical of very shallow seismic sources.
The four other 24-hour periods we have studied on 14–16 April and
10–11 May show a pattern of ground motions very similar to that displayed
in Figure 5. The distance of seismic sources from MDJ can easily be esti-
mated from the time difference between P and S arrivals. None of these signals
could have been generated by sources in North Korea (distances ranging from
250 to 370 to station MDJ—see Figure 1).
Finally, in our assessment of MDJ sensitivity to regional signals, we ana-
lyzed a set of recordings of small chemical explosions conducted for a geophys-
ical survey in August 1998 in Jilin Province, northeastern China, in a region
lying between North Korea and MDJ. There was some variability of coupling
in these shots, whose yields lay in the range 1–2 tons, and not all of the shots
were single-fired.17 When we applied the conventional short-time average/long-
time average detector to MDJ data we found that five of the chemical explo-
sions were detected, whereas the other five were not detected by MDJ (though
they were detected by other stations in Manchuria). Those explosions we could
not detect at MDJ were 1 ton explosions and/or shots conducted close to the
volcanic mountain called Paektu in Korea and Changbai in China,18 perhaps
suggesting higher seismic wave attenuation due to disturbed crust and upper
mantle around this volcano. Further discussion of these signals is given as part
of the next section.
DISCUSSION
Using three-component seismic signals from the North Korea explosions of
2006 and 2009 as templates, we conclude from Table 1 that no signal, originat-
ing from within a few km of these earlier announced nuclear tests, could have
occurred from an explosion source, larger than magnitude 1.15 on 14, 15, or 16
April in 2010; or larger than magnitude 1.39 on 10 or 11 May 2010.
For purposes of interpreting these magnitude thresholds in terms of a cor-
responding yield threshold, it is helpful first to make the estimate for an explo-
sion that is well-coupled in hard rock (which characterizes the geology of the
North Korean test site).19
One way to do this, is via a magnitude—yield relation such as magnitude =
4.25 + 0.75 ∗ log Y for yield Y in kilotons (suggested by analysts from Norway
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who have done extensive studies of the North Korea test site).20 This approach
leads to a yield threshold well below 1 ton (i.e., below 0.001 kt) for the North
Korea test site region, and is about a hundred times lower (i.e., better) than
the seismic monitoring capability as characterized by De Geer (quoted in the
Introduction).
Another way to appreciate that seismic monitoring of North Korea can be
conducted even at low yields, that is more direct and more satisfactory from
several perspectives, is to note that the archive of signals recorded by MDJ
includes examples from a geophysical research project, conducted by Ameri-
can and Chinese scientists in August 1998, that used chemical explosions with
yields in the range from about one to two tons in a refraction survey of Earth
structure associated with the volcano on the border between China and North
Korea. In four cases their signals were recorded at MDJ with signal-to-noise
high enough to enable easy detection by eye (that is, no need for the sophistica-
tion of a comparison between short-time average and long-time average signal
levels, let alone the use of cross-correlation methods). Indeed, signal quality
was high enough to enable measurement of their P-wave and S-wave spectra
from 1 hz to 15 hz.21 Examples of these signals are shown in Figure 6. The peak
amplitudes (zero-to-peak) of the vertical records from four shots range from
0.12 to 0.57 µm/s, whereas the noise amplitudes preceding the P-wave arrivals
are between 0.044 and 0.063 µm/s (Figure 6). Hence, signal-to-noise ratios are
between 2.0 (shot #2) and 11.6 (shot #4). Their quality is high, and indicative
of a capability easily to record seismic signals from the types of underground
nuclear test that De Geer has proposed for specific dates in April and May of
2010.
Seismologists use different magnitude scales for different purposes, and
the scale used above is mb (based upon teleseismic P-waves). More natural
for purposes of characterizing the strength of signals at the distances of a few
hundred km, is the local magnitude scale, ML, for which it is more appropriate
to characterize signals in terms of ground displacement rather than ground
velocity.22 We estimate that the magnitude threshold of signal detection using
conventional methods at MDJ for seismic signals generated around the North
Korean test site ranges from ML 1.7 to ML 2.0. That is, we can detect seismic
signals in the frequency band 1–5 hz from a ML 1.7 event occurring in north-
eastern North Korea during quiet night hours (2.4–4.3 nanometer background
noise amplitude on MDJ records), whereas the detection threshold is some-
what higher (ML 2.0) during the noisy daytime hours when noise level is up to
6 nanometers. This point is important, because it shows that classical seismo-
gram interpretation, while not placing such a low magnitude threshold as the
application of a correlation detector, can still, in the present case, reach down
approximately to the magnitude 2 level. And of course it applies to a broader
area, essentially to northeastern North Korea.
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Figure 6: Four examples of seismic signals recorded at MDJ from low yield (1 to 2 tons)
chemical explosions conducted as part of a geophysical survey in Jilin Province,
northeastern China, in August 1998. The largest signal amplitude is indicated for each trace.
Shot #2 shows the lowest signal-to-noise ratio (about 2.0, see text). Signals such as these, in
the waveform archive for MDJ, are of great importance in building confidence in the
monitoring capability enabled by this station.
If there were a low yield nuclear test in the southern part of North Korea,
then high-quality seismographic stations in South Korea would be more rele-
vant to assessing its size. De Geer does not offer an estimate, based upon the
radionuclide evidence, of the size of the nuclear tests he has proposed, and if
that evidence could be associated with tests at the single ton level rather than,
as he suggested, at the level of a few hundred tons, then our seismological
analysis cannot rule out such very-low-yield testing.
Our own analysis has been a small-scale effort, focusing on one high-
quality station. We note that on the order of one hundred seismographic sta-
tions are operated by agencies in and near the Korean peninsula, and their po-
tential monitoring capability is very high. These are stations in the networks of
Liaoning and Jilin Provinces in China; the DongBei network,23 also in China,
just to the north of the border with North Korea; and about thirty high-quality
broadband stations together with a short-period array in South Korea.
We are not aware of any analysis of IMS seismic data seeking to evaluate
De Geer’s hypothesized nuclear tests.24
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In the 1990s when the concepts of a primary network and an auxiliary
network were emerging, but prior to finalization of the CTBT text, the con-
cept of a supplementary network was also discussed, intended to contribute
data that would help characterize those events for which data from primary
and auxiliary stations needed augmentation. Though it has not been formal-
ized the concept of a supplementary network is still valid, and of course states
are free to use any data that may be available to help characterize an event
that a particular data subset indicates is unusual. Seismographic stations and
networks continue to grow in number, and capabilities to monitor earthquakes
and other seismic events continue to improve, driven largely by needs to study
seismic hazard and to elucidate Earth structure in ever-greater detail. The
key attribute necessary for such stations to provide data that can help evalu-
ate claims such as those made by De Geer—whether the data is confirmatory
or tends to be negative—is open access. We note that station MDJ is part of
a network that is a member of the international Federation of Digital Seismo-
graphic Networks (FDSN), and that “Members agree to . . . provide free and
open access to their data.”25
We note two reasons the detection threshold we are reporting for the North
Korean test site is so low.26 First, in the present case we had access to a ma-
jor asset that is not always available, namely, an archive of previously studied
seismic records from explosions at locations close to that of our particular inter-
est. This enabled use of the sophisticated multichannel CC and SCC detectors.
Second, detection thresholds are usually reported27 in the context of an evalu-
ation of standard methods of analysis that must be applied routinely to a fixed
network to find numerous events (on the order of a few hundred per day). But
our present study took an ad hoc approach (that may not always be available),
in which we emphasized use of a supplementary station with data of relevance
to the study of a focused geographic region and a limited period of time, and
a variety of detection methods including some that cannot be used routinely.
In such situations, which in general are becoming more and more available
as archives grow and station density increases, monitoring capability can be
significantly better than that indicated by routine methods.
The main conclusion of our analysis is that no well-coupled underground
explosion above about a ton occurred near the North Korea nuclear test site in
the year 2010 on the five days hypothesized by De Geer. As for the possibility
that another test site was used, the evidence available to us is that any nu-
clear test would have had to be very small (local magnitude less than about 2)
to escape detection at stations in and near the Korean peninsula but outside
North Korea.
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